【wktk】韓国経済ﾜｸﾃｶスレ 101won【101匹wow・won大後進】

【wktk】韓国経済ﾜｸﾃｶ ..

77:日出づる処の名無し
08/08/02 18:20:09 GkkIDLkm
この所ダブスタで評判の悪いグリーンスパンですが、自伝「The Age of Turbulance」の中から
前回の韓国通貨危機についてのくだりをコピペしておきますね
(英語版のEBOOKをダウソしたのでw)

Just as during Mexico's crisis two years before, the International Monetary Fund moved
in with financial support. Bob Rubin, Larry Summers, and the Treasury Department again
spearheaded the U.S. response; the Fed again played largely an advisory role. I got more
deeply involved only in November, when a senior official at the Bank of Japan called the
Fed to warn that South Korea would be the next to go. "The dam is bursting" is how the
official put it, explaining that Japanese banks had lost confidence in Korea and were
about to stop renewing tens of billions of dollars in loans.

This was a shock. A symbol of Asia's remarkable growth, South Korea was now the world's
eleventh-largest economy, twice the size of Russia. Korea was so successful that it was
no longer even considered a developing nation?the World Bank officially listed it as part
of the first world. And while market watchers knew that there had been problems recently,
the economy by all indications was still growing solidly and fast. Korea's central bank was
also sitting on $25 billion in dollar reserves?ample protection against the Asian contagion,
or so we thought.

What we didn't know, but soon discovered, was that the government had played games with
those reserves. It had quietly sold or lent most of the dollars to South Korean commercial
banks, which in turn had used them to shore up bad loans. So when Charlie Siegman, one
of our top international economists, phoned a Korean central banker on Thanksgiving
weekend and asked, "Why don' t you release more of your reserves?" the banker answered,
"We don' t have any." What they'd published as reserves had already been spoken for.

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